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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
John Henry Rivera appeals from the judgment of conviction following his jury trial 
on one count of grand theft. Mr. Rivera asserts that the district court erred when it 
denied his motion for a mistrial, made during the State's opening statement. Mr. Rivera 
further asserts that his conviction should be vacated in light of the prosecutor's 
objected-to misconduct during closing argument. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Rivera was charged with grand theft for purportedly taking a financial 
transaction card with the intent to deprive another of the card (R, pp.50-51), based on 
an incident that occurred while Mr. Rivera was employed by the United States Forest 
Service (hereinafter, Forest Service) during the summer of 2009. (Tr., p.45, L.23 -
p.48, L.12.) In late July, several days before he left his employment with the Forest 
Service, a wallet belonging to Forest Service employee Vickie Hulsizer went missing 
from the office. (Tr., p.48, Ls.12-20.) Among the items in the wallet were several credit 
cards and a debit card tied to Ms. Hulsizer's checking account. {Tr., p.58, Ls.4-25.) 
In October 2009, Mr. Rivera was interviewed by Detective Rory Johnson of the 
Coeur D'Alene Police Department. During the interview, Mr. Rivera admitted that he 
took the wallet and hid it in the ceiling of the men's restroom because he didn't like 
Ms. Hulsizer as "she was bitchy most of the time and had a cocky attitude." {Tr., p.92, 
Ls.5-25.) Mr. Rivera denied ever opening the wallet, and Detective Johnson did not 
dust the wallet or its contents for prints, have it tested for DNA, or submit the wallet to 
the Idaho State Police crime laboratory for examination. {Tr., p.104, L.7 - p.105, L.15.) 
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During the State's opening statement, the prosecutor said, "You are going to 
hear testimony today about his [Mr. Rivera's] habits as an employee. He was 
argumentative and unsatisfactory in his performance." (Tr., p.29, Ls.21-23.) Defense 
counsel objected, arguing that the prosecutor's statement was "argument and it's 
irrelevant" before moving for a mistrial under Idaho Criminal Rule 29.1. In support of his 
request for a mistrial, defense counsel argued that the prosecutor's statement was 
prejudicial to Mr. Rivera and deprived him of a fair trial. (Tr., p.30, Ls.15-20.} Defense 
counsel then explained, 
[W]hat we have here is in opening statement irrelevant, prejudicial 
character assassination in regard to my client. 
There is no need for the State in a case like this to state - to accuse, 
essentially, my client of being argumentative, unsatisfactory performance, 
anything like that. This is not a wrongful termination case. This is not 
anything like that. This is a criminal case brought by the State of Idaho 
and is - Judge, those adjectives cannot - well, they constitute 404(b} 
evident Judge. This is uncharged misconduct without notice. This is 
character disparagement, sir. That's a bell that cannot be unrung. 
Certainly, the State could never prove that by witnesses. Certainly, the 
State knew or should have known that those statements would engender 
emotion [sic] - had to engender emotion [sicJ such as is being made 
before this Court now. 
Judge, even if you were to instruct, my client can't get a fair trial at this 
time ... You can't unring that bell. 
I'd ask the Court to declare a mistrial at this time. 
(Tr., p.31, L.10 - p.32, L.2.} 
The State's response to defense counsel's motion was set forth, in relevant part, 
as follows: 
I find it curious, your Honor, that he [defense counsel] can argue that it 
was irrelevant, but at the same time prejudicial if it's indeed irrelevant so, 
therefore it doesn't warrant a mistrial under Rule 29.1. 
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In addition, your Honor, Mr. Chapman is assuming that everything that 
comes out of my mouth, despite your instruction - he is assuming the jury 
ignored your instruction not to consider my opening argument as 
evidence. So jury instructions couldn't carry [sic] any sort of alleged 
defect in the opening I did provide to this Court. 
If anything, your Honor, there is no need to grant it, and I believe that if 
any alleged misconduct or any sort of prejudicial error did occur in opening 
argument, it could easily be cured with a jury instruction and we 
respectfully request in your sound discretion that you overrule the motion 
for a mistrial. 
(Tr., p.32, L.19 - p.33, L.20.) 
Defense counsel responded by reiterating that the prosecutor's statement about 
Mr. Rivera's habits and performance at work "most certainly is 404(b) evidence" and 
that "the State has deprived John [Mr. Rivera] of his right to a fair trial." (Tr., p.33, L.24 
- p.34, L. 15.) 
The district court denied the motion, reasoning, 
[A]ssuming for the fact of this argument here that a reference by the State 
to Mr. Rivera as being argumentative and unsatisfactory in his 
performance as being an objectionable statement and inappropriate under 
a 404(b) standard, I have to look and recognize that the State's argument 
is just that. It is argument. It is not evidence that is to be offered or 
accepted by the jury. And while certainly that statement may have some 
arguable impact upon the jury that cannot be unrung, I don't think at this 
particular stage of this process that the Court can come to the conclusion 
that Mr. Rivera is not capable of receiving a fair trial. 
Although I would caution the State that I don't know that the focus of their 
argument, 1 continued argument here, should be on Mr. Rivera's work 
1 Inexplicably, both the State and the district court repeatedly referred to the opening 
statement as argument. Opening statements are intended to offer a roadmap of the 
evidence expected to be produced at trial, and are most certainly not supposed to 
include argument. See State v. Griffith, 97 Idaho 52, 56 (1975) ("Opening statements 
serve to inform the jury of the issues of the case and briefly outline the evidence each 
litigant intends to introduce ... Generally, opening remarks should be confined to a brief 
summary of evidence counsel expects to introduce on behalf of his client's case-in-
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habits or personal behaviors other than to the extent that it relates to the 
alleged charge here[.] 
(Tr., p.36, Ls.1-23.) 
The State's theory of the case was that Mr. Rivera was guilty of grand theft 
because he took and hid Ms. Hulsizer's wallet (which contained a financial transaction 
card) with the intent to deprive her of it permanently.2 (Tr., p.158, L.3 - p.159, L.15.) 
The defense theory of the case was that while Mr. Rivera's conduct was unjustified, the 
State was "blowing this all out of proportion[]" by charging it as a grand theft. 
(Tr., p.162, Ls.1-20.) 
During closing argument, the prosecuting attorney said, "Now, you heard 
testimony that they actually found it [the wallet] in the wall. I can think of no better place 
to put that wallet in that building to hide it permanently." Defense counsel immediately 
objected, arguing, "That's a personal statement; vouching." The objection was 
overruled, and the prosecuting attorney again argued, "If you wanted to permanently 
deprive, there's no better place to put it than in that wall." (Tr., p.159, Ls.9-18.) 
Ultimately, the jury found Mr. Rivera guilty of grand theft (Tr., p.171, Ls.22-24), 
and Mr. Rivera was sentenced to four years in prison, with one and one-half years fixed, 
with execution of the sentence suspended pending his completion of two years of 
probation. (R., p.165.) Mr. Rivera filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the Order 
Suspending Execution of Judgment and Sentence. (Notice of Appeal3.) 
chief. Counsel should not attempt to impeach or otherwise argue the merits of evidence 
that the opposing side has or will present."). 
2 In its rebuttal closing argument, the State argued, consistent with State v. Solway, 139 
Idaho 965 (Ct. App. 2004), that it was not required to prove that Mr. Rivera knew what 
was in the wallet when he took it and hid it in order to be guilty of grand theft by taking a 
bank transaction card. (Tr., p.167, Ls.18-23.) 
3 A file-stamped copy of the Notice of Appeal is attached to a Motion to Augment filed 
contemporaneously with this Brief. 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Rivera's motion for a mistrial? 
2. Should Mr. Rivera's conviction be vacated based on the State's objected-to 
misconduct during closing arguments? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Rivera's Motion For A Mistrial 
A. Introduction 
The State's opening statement, in which it improperly described Mr. Rivera's 
character traits while employed by the Forest Service as "argumentative and 
unsatisfactory in his performance[,}" when viewed in the context of the entire trial, 
prejudiced Mr. Rivera and deprived him of his right to a fair trial. As such, the district 
court erred when it denied his motion for a mistrial. 
8. Standard Of Review 
In State v. Urquhart, 105 Idaho 92 (Ct. App. 1983), the Idaho Court of Appeals 
set forth the standard of review of a district court's refusal to grant a mistrial as follows: 
[T}he question on appeal is not whether the trial judge reasonably 
exercised his discretion in light of circumstances existing when the mistrial 
motion was made. Rather, the question must be whether the event which 
precipitated the motion for mistrial represented reversible error when 
viewed in the context of the full record. Thus, where a motion for mistrial 
has been denied in a criminal case, the "abuse of discretion" standard is a 
misnomer. The standard, more accurately stated, is one of reversible 
error. Our focus is upon the continuing impact on the trial of the incident 
that triggered the mistrial motion. The trial judge's refusal to declare a 
mistrial will be disturbed only if that incident, viewed retrospectively, 
constituted reversible error. 
Id. at 95. 
C. The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Rivera's Motion For A Mistrial 
Idaho Criminal Rule 29.1 (a), in relevant part, provides: 
A mistrial may be declared upon motion of the defendant, when there 
occurs during the trial an error or legal defect in the proceedings, or 
conduct inside or outside the courtroom, which is prejudicial to the 
defendant and deprives the defendant of a fair trial. 
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Id. 
When considering the denial of a motion for a mistrial, "[t]he threshold inquiry is 
whether the state introduced error." State v. Grantham, 146 Idaho 490, 498 (Ct. App. 
2008) (citing State v. Shepherd, 124 Idaho 54, 57 (Ct. App. 1993)). Additionally, in 
order to be reversible, the error must have been prejudicial. Id. Therefore, in order for 
Mr. Rivera to prevail on appeal from the denial of his motion for a mistrial, he must 
demonstrate: (1) that the State introduced error into the trial, and (2) that the error was 
prejudicial in light of the whole record. 
1. The State Introduced Error Into The Trial 
During the State's opening statement, the prosecutor stated, "You are going to 
hear testimony today about his [Mr. Rivera's] habits as an employee. He was 
argumentative and unsatisfactory in his performance." (Tr., p.29, Ls.21-23.) Defense 
counsel objected, arguing that the prosecutor's statement was "argument and it's 
irrelevant" before moving for a mistrial under Idaho Criminal Rule 29.1. In support of his 
request for a mistrial, defense counsel argued that the prosecutor's statement was 
prejudicial to Mr. Rivera and deprived him of a fair trial. (Tr., p.30, Ls.15-20.) Defense 
counsel then explained, 
[W]hat we have here is in opening statement irrelevant, prejudicial 
character assassination in regard to my client. 
There is no need for the State in a case like this to state - to accuse, 
essentially, my client of being argumentative, unsatisfactory performance, 
anything like that. This is not a wrongful termination case. This is not 
anything like that. This is a criminal case brought by the State of Idaho 
and is - Judge, those adjectives cannot - well, they constitute 404(b) 
evident Judge. This is uncharged misconduct without notice. This is 
character disparagement, sir. That's a bell that cannot be unrung. 
Certainly, the State could never prove that by witnesses. Certainly, the 
State knew or should have known that those statements would engender 
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emotion [sicJ - had to engender emotion [sic] such as is being made 
before this Court now. 
Judge, even if you were to instruct, my client can't get a fair trial at this 
time ... You can't unring that bell. 
I'd ask the Court to declare a mistrial at this time. 
(Tr., p.31, L.10-p.32, L.2.) 
The State's response to defense counsel's motion was set forth, in relevant part, 
as follows: 
In addition, your Honor, Mr. Chapman is assuming that everything that 
comes out of my mouth, despite your instruction - he is assuming the jury 
ignored your instruction not to consider my opening argument as 
evidence. So jury instructions couldn't carry [sic] any sort of alleged 
defect in the opening I did provide to this Court. 
If anything, your Honor, there is no need to grant it, and I believe that if 
any alleged misconduct or any sort of prejudicial error did occur in opening 
argument, it could easily be cured with a jury instruction and we 
respectfully request in your sound discretion that you overrule the motion 
for a mistrial. 
(Tr., p.32, L.19 - p.33, L.20.) 
Defense counsel responded by reiterating that the prosecutor's statement as to 
Mr. Rivera's purportedly poor performance at work "most certainly is 404(b) evidence" 
and that "the State has deprived John [Mr. Rivera] of his right to a fair trial." (Tr., p.33, 
L.24 - p.34, L.15.) 
The district court denied the motion, reasoning, 
[A]ssuming for the fact of this argument here that a reference by the State 
to Mr. Rivera as being argumentative and unsatisfactory in his 
performance as being an objectionable statement and inappropriate under 
a 404(b) standard, I have to look and recognize that the State's argument 
is just that. It is argument. It is not evidence that is to be offered or 
accepted by the jury. And while certainly that statement may have some 
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arguable impact upon the jury that cannot be unrung, I don't think at this 
particular stage of this process that the Court can come to the conclusion 
that Mr. Rivera is not capable of receiving a fair trial. 
Although I would caution the State that I don't know that the focus of their 
argument, continued argument here, should be on Mr. Rivera's work 
habits or personal behaviors other than to the extent that it relates to the 
alleged charge here[.] 
(Tr., p.36, Ls.1-23.) 
Although the United States Supreme Court has never explicitly held that it is 
misconduct for a prosecutor to highlight in his opening statement evidence that he 
knows, or should know, is inadmissible under the rules of evidence, there can be little 
doubt that such a tactic is improper. American Bar Association standards, for example, 
expressly prohibit such behavior: 
The prosecutor's opening statement should be confined to a statement of the 
issues in the case and the evidence the prosecutor intends to offer which the 
prosecutor believes in good faith will be available and admissible. A 
prosecutor should not allude to any evidence unless there is a good faith and 
reasonable basis for believing that such evidence will be tendered and 
admitted in evidence. 
American Bar Association, Prosecution Function Standard 3-5.5 (available at 
<http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/standards/pfunc_blk.html#5.5>) (emphases added). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has noted, in dictum, that such behavior is improper. 
In Mattson v. Bryan, 92 Idaho 587 (1968), the Idaho Supreme Court discussed some of 
the limitations on opening statements: 
A general discussion of the scope and function of the opening statement 
of counsel is set forth in Miller v. Braun, 196 Kan. 313, 411 P.2d 621 
(1966): 
"Generally speaking, counsel may outline in his opening 
statement what he expects to prove unless it is manifest that 
such proof would be incompetent, or the statement is made 
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for the purpose of creating prejudice. . . . The rule is stated 
in 53 Am. Jur., Trial § 456, p.358, as follows: 
"'It is generally held that statements by counsel that certain 
evidence will be introduced are not improper if made in good 
faith and with reasonable ground to believe that the evidence 
is admissible, even though the intended proof referred to is 
afterward excluded .... "' 
Mattson, 92 Idaho at 592 (emphases added). 
Id. 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(a), in relevant part, provides: 
Evidence of a person's character or a trait of character is not admissible 
for the purpose of proving that the person acted in conformity therewith on 
a particular occasion, except ... Evidence of a pertinent trait of the 
accused's character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut 
the same[.] 
Rule 404(b)'s related general exclusion of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or 
bad acts is 
based upon the theory that such evidence induces the jury to believe the 
accused is more likely to have committed the charged crime because he 
or she is a person of bad character. It thus takes the jury away from its 
primary consideration, which is the defendant's guilt or innocence of the 
particular crime for which he or she is on trial. 
Shepherd, 124 Idaho at 57 (citing State v. Winkler, 112 Idaho 917,919 (Ct. App. 1993). 
The prosecutor's statement that testimony would show that Mr. Rivera was 
"argumentative and unsatisfactory in his performance" at work was inadmissible 
character evidence. The prosecutor's statements came during the prosecutor's opening 
statement, which was given before defense counsel's opening statement. As such, it 
could not possibly have been an attempt by the prosecutor to rebut any statement made 
by defense counsel regarding Mr. Rivera's character. Assuming, arguendo, that 
testimony concerning Mr. Rivera's reputation and behavior at work was admissible, it 
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was nonetheless inadmissible on the facts of this case because the prosecutor failed to 
provide pre-trial notice of his intent to introduce such evidence at trial. I.R.E. 404(b). 
2. The Error Was Prejudicial 
In determining whether the denial of a motion for a mistrial was erroneous, 
[T]he question is whether the event which precipitated the motion for 
mistrial represented reversible error when viewed in the context of the full 
record, i.e., whether [it] contributed to the verdict in light of all the other 
evidence. 
State v. Barcella, 135 Idaho 191, 198 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing Shepherd, 124 Idaho at 57 
and State v. Guinn, 114 Idaho 30, 34-35 (Ct. App. 1988)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
In Barce/la, the Court found that, although it was error for a State's witness to 
blurt out that the defendant, who was on trial for murder, had previously confessed to 
having gotten away with a "couple other shootings[,]" the Court held that the error "was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." In reaching this conclusion, the Court explained, 
Lane was the state's twentieth witness. Prior to his testimony, the jury had 
been told by the defense that Barcella had a prior felony conviction. The 
jury heard testimony from bartender Smeltzer, bar patron Bakie, and Thrift 
that Barcella had told them he intended to kill Smith. The jury also heard 
testimony from Thrift, Bob and Lane that Barcella admitted to killing Smith. 
Thrift and Bob both testified that Barcella owned a Pulaski. Thrift also 
testified that he saw Barcella wiping off Smith's doorknob with a bandana 
when Thrift came out of his room the night Smith was killed. Bobo 
testified that the Pulaski was missing from Barcella's roomt he next day. A 
Pulaski was recovered from under the bed in Smith's room. 
We are convinced, beyond a reasonable doubt, that even if Lane's blurt 
about prior shootings had not been heard by the jury, the remaining 
evidence would have easily led the jury to return a guilty verdict. Given 
the totality of admissible evidence, and when viewed in the context of the 
full record, Lane's blurt did not contribute to Barcella's conviction. 
Id. at 199 (footnote and citation omitted). 
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The trial in this case was relatively short, and included testimony from only four 
witnesses: Cynthia Carter, Vickie Hulsizer, Detective Johnson, and Pat Finnegan. 
Ms. Carter testified first, providing some brief background information with respect to the 
length of Mr. Rivera's employment and his duties while employed, and testified that 
Ms. Hulsizer's wallet went missing a few days before Mr. Rivera's Forest Service 
employment ended. (Tr., p.45, L 13- p.52, L.3.) 
Of significance to Mr. Rivera's motion for a mistrial, the following exchange took 
place during the State's direct examination of Ms. Carter: 
[Prosecutor:] Now, when was the defendant terminated from his job 
- or - I'm sorry. 
[Defense counsel:] Objection, your Honor, assumes facts not in 
relevance [sic]; uncharged misconduct, your Honor, 
again. 
[The Court:] 
[Prosecutor:] 
[Witness:] 
[Prosecutor:] 
[Witness:] 
Well, sustained. I think Mr. Robbins was about to 
rephrase the question. 
Go ahead. 
Yes, your Honor. 
Is the defendant in this case still employed with the 
Forest Service? 
No, he is not. 
How did his employment end? 
When I-
[Defense counsel:] Objection; relevance, your Honor. 
[The Court:] 
[Prosecutor:] 
Sustained. 
When did his employment end? 
[Defense counsel:] Objection; relevance. 
[The Court:] Overruled. 
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[Defense counsel:] Asked and answered. 
[The Court:] 
[Witness:] 
Well, I'm not sure we've got an answer to that 
question. I'll overrule. 
You can answer the question as to when his 
employment ended. 
On August the 4th , John didn't show up for work, sol 
asked Vickie if she knew where he was. She said he 
had gone home on Friday -
[Defense counsel:] Objection; hearsay. 
[The Court:] Sustained. A little more information than was 
requested. 
(Tr., p.50, L.3 - p.51, L.10 (brackets in original) (emphases added).) 
Thus, within minutes of the State's misconduct during opening statements which 
resulted in the motion for a mistrial, the State sought to elicit testimony for which it had 
provided no Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b) notice, was irrelevant, and was highly 
prejudicial. This additional misconduct by the prosecutor served only to reinforce in the 
jury's mind that Mr. Rivera was a bad employee and had been terminated from his 
employment with the Forest Service. This weighs heavily in favor of a finding of 
prejudice when examining the record as a whole. 
The next witness called was the alleged victim, Vicki Hulsizer. She testified as to 
the details surrounding the disappearance of her wallet, what she did after it went 
missing, and that the only thing missing from her wallet when it was returned to her was 
an unknown amount of cash. 4 (Tr., p.52, L.19 - p.69, L.2, p.76, L.18 -p.84, L.6.) The 
4 Defense counsel made another motion for a mistrial when Ms. Hulsizer testified that 
cash was missing from her wallet when it was returned to her. He argued that the 
testimony amounted to uncharged misconduct evidence that was being introduced 
without the requisite Rule 404(b) notice. The motion was denied, with the district court 
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State then called Detective Johnson, who discussed the details of his investigation of 
this case, including that during an interview with Mr. Rivera several months after 
Ms. Hulsizer's wallet went missing Mr. Rivera admitted to taking the wallet and hiding it 
in the ceiling of the men's restroom because he didn't care for Ms. Hulsizer. (Tr., p.85, 
L.2 - p.108, L.9.) 
The State's final witness was Pat Finnegan, a special agent with the Forest 
Service. Mr. Finnegan testified that, after learning of Mr. Rivera's confession, he went 
to the men's restroom and assisted in retrieving Ms. Hulsizer's wallet, which had fallen 
into the wall of the restroom. (Tr., p.118, L.8 - p.129, L.1.) The defense briefly recalled 
Detective Johnson on the issue of the purportedly missing money, and the State briefly 
called Mr. Finnegan in rebuttal on that issue. (Tr., p.131, L.16-p.139, L.25.) 
Considering the motion for a mistrial in the context of the whole trial, especially 
the fact that this case consisted of less than one-hundred pages of transcribed 
testimony from four witnesses, some of which included the State's attempt to elicit 
improper testimony regarding how Mr. Rivera's Forest Service employment ended, 
Mr. Rivera asserts that the district court committed error when it denied his motion for a 
mistrial because it is impossible to say, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error in 
opening statements did not contribute to the verdict. As such, he respectfully requests 
that this Court vacate his conviction, and remand this matter for a new trial. 
holding that it was not 404(b) evidence. (Tr., p.69, L.18 - p.75, L.19.) Mr. Rivera does 
not appeal from this ruling. 
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I l. 
Mr. Rivera's Conviction Should Be Vacated Based On Objected-To Prosecutorial 
Misconduct During Closing Arguments 
A. Introduction 
Because it touched on the only issue of dispute in the case - namely whether 
Mr. Rivera intended to deprive the victim of her financial transaction card permanently -
the prosecutor's inappropriate insertion of his personal opinion and facts not in evidence 
regarding the significance of the location of the wallet, made and repeated over defense 
counsel's objection, could have influenced the jury's verdict. As such, Mr. Rivera's 
conviction must be vacated. 
8. Standard Of Review 
When a defendant objects to prosecutorial misconduct at trial, the harmless error 
test set forth in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), is applied. State v. Perry, 
150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010). In Perry, this Court explained the application of that test as 
follows, 
Id. 
C. 
Where the defendant meets his initial burden of showing that a violation 
occurred, the State then has the burden of demonstrating to the appellate 
court beyond a reasonable doubt that the constitutional violation did not 
contribute to the jury's verdict. 
Mr. Rivera's Conviction Should Be Vacated Based On Obiected-To Prosecutorial 
Misconduct During Closing Arguments 
During closing argument, the prosecuting attorney said, "Now, you heard 
testimony that they actually found it [the wallet] in the wall. I can think of no better place 
to put that wallet in that building to hide it permanently." Defense counsel immediately 
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objected, arguing, "That's a personal statement; vouching." The objection was 
overruled, and the prosecuting attorney again argued, "If you wanted to permanently 
deprive, there's no better place to put it than in that wall." (Tr., p.159, Ls.9-18.) 
While a prosecutor may express an opinion as to the guilt of a defendant during 
closing argument, when doing so "the prosecutor should exercise caution to avoid 
interjecting his personal belief and should explicitly state that the opinion is based solely 
on inferences from evidence presented at trial." State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86 n. 1 
(Ct. App. 2007) (quoting State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742, 753 n. 1 (1991)) (emphasis 
added) (internal punctuation omitted). The Phillips opinion advised, "The safer course is 
for a prosecutor to avoid the statement of opinion, as well as the disfavored phrases 'I 
think' and 'I believe' altogether. Id. (citing State v. Rosencrantz, 110 Idaho 124, 131 
(Ct. App. 1986). Additionally, a prosecutor may not refer to facts not in evidence during 
closing argument. Phillips, 144 Idaho at 86.5 
The central dispute in this case was whether Mr. Rivera intended to deprive the 
victim of her wallet (containing a financial transaction card) permanently, with 
Mr. Rivera's defense consisting of an argument that his conduct was nothing more than 
a childish prank. The prosecutor's improper insertion of his personal opinion regarding 
Mr. Rivera's guilt, along with an argument based on facts not in evidence (no one 
testified that there was no better place to place the wallet in order to deprive a person of 
it permanently), could very well have contributed to the jury's guilty verdict. As such, 
5 For more on the extensive record of prosecutorial misconduct compiled by Kootenai 
County prosecutors, see Judge Schwartzman's concurring opinion in Phillips, detailing 
the "long line or pattern of repetitious misconduct from this prosecutorial office." 
Phillips, 144 Idaho at 89. A more recent (and egregious) instance of prosecutorial 
misconduct involving this office is memorialized in State v. Ellington, Idaho_, 253 
P.3d 727 (2011). 
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unless the State can establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecutorial 
misconduct did not contribute to the jury's verdict, then Mr. Rivera is entitled to a new 
trial. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Rivera respectfully requests that this Court 
vacate the judgment of conviction, and remand this matter to the district court for a new 
trial. 
DATED this 26th day of July, 2011. 
SPENGERJ.HAHN 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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